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1 Introduction
Allowing for international immigration is often argued to mitigate the old-age security
crisis faced by most industrialized countries. Basically, this argument builds on the
fact that immigrants rejuvenate the host country’s age structure as they are on average
younger than natives. Razin & Sadka (1999) formalize this point in a full employment
context.
Obviously, the implications of immigration for pay-as-you-go pensions are intimately
linked to the labor market eﬀects. However, these eﬀects are far from unambiguous,
once the unrealistic assumption of competitive labor markets is abandoned (Schmidt
et al., 1994; Razin and Sadka, 1995; Fuest and Thum, 2000).
The literature on immigration to economies with distorted labor markets has virtu-
ally not considered pay-as-you-go pensions explicitly. Nevertheless, the conjecture is
that immigration still stabilizes public pensions provided that suﬃcient wage ﬂexibil-
ity creates jobs. This presumption is corroborated by Kemnitz (2003), the only study
hitherto linking immigration and public pensions in the presence of unemployment.
Identifying union wage setting as the source of unemployment, Kemnitz (2003) utilizes
the standard model of bargaining at the ﬁrm level. However, there is signiﬁcant in-
ternational variation in the degree of union centralization. According to a number of
studies originating with Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988), ﬁrm level bargaining is a proper
description for the Anglo-Saxon world, but not for many European countries, in par-
ticular the Nordic ones, where wage setting is heavily centralized.1 The consequences
of immigration in such a setting are by and large unexplored.
This paper scrutinizes the eﬀects of immigration on public pensions when a large trade
union dominates the labor market. It shows that the above popular argument reverts
in this setup: In any unemployment equilibrium, immigration harms public pensions
whenever the total number of jobs increases. As a consequence, an alleviation of
the demographic burden of social security occurs only if total employment declines.
Whether this is the case depends on the existing level of unemployment in the host
economy.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model, derives the
labor market equilibrium and examines the eﬀects of immigration. Section 3 concludes.
1Golden et al. (2002) provide a recent update of the Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) classiﬁcation.Immigrant Employment and Demographic Burden 3
2 The Model
Consider an economy of two overlapping generations where people are ﬁt for work in
the ﬁrst period of life and retire in the second. We normalize the size of each native
generation to unity: Nt = 1. In period t, the workforce increases unexpectedly by the
immigration of Mt young individuals. Except for immigration, the economy is closed.
In every period, atomistic ﬁrms produce the single output good by a standard neoclas-
sical production function combining physical capital Kt and labor Lt:
Yt = F(Kt,Lt) = Ltf(kt),
where kt = Kt/Lt is the capital intensity. Proﬁt maximization gives the usual marginal
productivity conditions:
rt = f
0(kt), wt = f(kt) − ktf
0(kt). (1)
The capital market is competitive, so the interest rate rt adjusts such that the physical
capital is fully utilized. However, aggregate employment is endogenous because ﬁrms
hire only so much labor that the marginal productivity equals the wage wt determined
by the trade union. The wage setting process will be addressed below.
Every individual receives utility from consumption in both periods of life (c respectively








Each employed earns a net wage (1−τU −τP)wt, where τU and τP are the contribution
rates to unemployment insurance and public pensions. Unemployed young receive the
beneﬁt bt, and the old get the pension pi
t. Letting i ∈ {E,U} denote the employment
status of a young individual, consumption is given by:
c
i











t are private savings and d = 1 ⇐⇒ i = E and d = 0 ⇐⇒ i = U. Like in
e.g. Razin & Sadka (1999) and Casarico & Devillanova (2003), the pension beneﬁt is
a demogrant: pi
t+1 = ¯ pt+1.4 Immigrant Employment and Demographic Burden










t+1) and Rt+1 = 1 + rt+1. Individual indirect utility in state i can




t+1/Rt+1 is discounted lifetime income in
that state. Hence, the expected indirect utility of a generation t individual is:
Vt = (1 − ηt)v(I
E
t ,Rt+1) + ηtv(I
U
t ,Rt+1), (6)
where ηt is the unemployment probability of a member of generation t. Immigrants
and natives are economically identical, so we assume equal employment probabilities:
ηt = Nt+Mt−Lt
Nt+Mt . Hence, ηt corresponds to the unemployment rate. Moreover, we posit
risk aversion, that is indirect utility is concave in income:2 ∂v
∂Ii




Physical capital depreciates fully after one period. Hence, the current capital stock
equals last period savings:
Kt+1 = ηt(Nt + Mt)s
U
t + (1 − ηt)(Nt + Mt)s
E
t . (7)
The welfare state cares for the young unemployed and the elderly. Both contribution
rates being constant over time, budget balance requires:3
τUwtLt = bt(Nt + Mt − Lt), (8)
τPwtLt = (Nt−1 + Mt−1)¯ pt. (9)
The trade union is formed by all individuals of the working generation. In contrast to
the existing literature (Corneo and Marquardt, 2000; Irmen and Wigger, 2002), this
union is large in the sense that it controls the economy-wide wage.
In any standard OLG framework like the present one, the conﬂict between labor and
capital is necessarily also a conﬂict between the young and the old. Moreover, indi-
viduals are aﬃliated with diﬀerent classes over the life cycle, present union members
becoming capitalists later in life.
2This property results from a number of assumptions on (2), the most obvious one being additive
separability: U12 = 0.
3The constant τP is usual in the literature (Razin & Sadka, 1999; Casarico & Devillanova, 2003).
In the context of small unions, Kemnitz (2004) has shown that a constant unemployment contribution
rate is very conducive to wage ﬂexibility.Immigrant Employment and Demographic Burden 5
We follow the common view that the trade union represents the interests of labor.
Therefore, we assume that the union sets the wage in order to maximize the utility
eﬀects of the wage-related components of lifetime income and neglects eﬀects via capital
incomes. Otherwise, the union would take the consequences of current wage setting
on future interest rates via aggregate savings into account. However, this would mean
that the union cares for (future) capitalists at the expense of (future) workers, and
the union could not be identiﬁed as labor’s agent.4 Therefore we restrict the union’s
interest to current utility, internalizing the eﬀects on unemployment and welfare state
budgets, but disregarding dynamic factor price repercussions.
Formally, the trade union in period t maximizes (6) with respect to wt, taking Kt
and rt+1 as given, but considering the marginal productivity conditions (1), individual































with strict equality if Lt < Nt + Mt.
Proposition 1. In any labor market equilibrium with unemployment, the union sets
a wage in the inelastic region of labor demand.
Proof. An unemployment equilibrium requires that (10) holds with equality and
∂2Vt























(Nt + Mt − Lt)2,
where εt = ∂Lt
∂wt
wt





















































The ﬁrst row in (11) is negative as v(I)− ∂v




∂I2(I −x) > 0. Moreover, the term in square brackets in the second
row is unambiguously positive. Therefore, (11) can hold only if εt > −1.
4This complication is original to the large union setup. As emphasized by Devereux and Lockwood
(1991), the small union has a negligible impact on aggregate savings and hence the interest rate.6 Immigrant Employment and Demographic Burden
To clarify the economics behind this result, consider a wage cut starting from a point
in the non-inelastic part of labor demand (εt ≤ −1). First, the risk averse union
members proﬁt as the rise in employment reduces the probability of the bad state of
unemployment. Second, the sum of resources available to the young in both states, the
wage bill, either remains constant (εt = −1) or even increases (εt < −1). Consequently,
a lower wage would diminish income uncertainty without sacriﬁcing total resources and
make union members better oﬀ than before. Hence, εt ≤ 1 cannot be an equilibrium.
Put diﬀerently, any equilibrium wage leading to unemployment must trade oﬀ the lower
income risk with a reduction of the wage bill, which requires a (locally) inelastic labor
demand.
Now, what are the eﬀects of immigration?
Proposition 2. Immigration has an ambiguous impact on both the unemployment
beneﬁt and total employment. Employment rises (falls) if the unemployment rate is











where the denominator is positive due to the second order condition of the union’s
maximization problem (∂2Vt
∂w2










(Nt + Mt − Lt)2 [τU(1 + ε)wt + εbt]
equals the sign of the last term in square brackets. Employing (8) yields:
∂2Vt
∂w∂M
R 0 ⇐⇒ Lt R (1 + ε)(Nt + Mt),
and hence dLt
dMt R 0 ⇐⇒ Lt Q (1 + ε)(Nt + Mt) and since Lt = (1 − ηt)(Nt + Mt):
dLt
dMt
R 0 ⇐⇒ ηt R −εt. (12)











− (1 − ηt)

, (13)
where the ﬁrst term in square brackets is positive because of (12) whereas the second
term is negative.Immigrant Employment and Demographic Burden 7
The economic intuition is as follows. If the wage (and hence total employment) re-
mained at the pre-migration level, immigration would make unemployment more likely
and decrease the beneﬁt. The union works against this by adjusting the wage.
However, the inelasticity of labor demand renders the direction of the wage adjustment
ambiguous: a wage cut brings more individuals into employment, but also diminishes
unemployment insurance revenues. The ﬁrst eﬀect increases in the unemployment rate,
and the second one in the inelasticity of labor demand.
Regarding public pensions, we have:
Proposition 3. Immigration alleviates the demographic burden only if it decreases
total employment.
















Pension payments are a constant fraction of the total wage bill. This wage bill increases
only when total employment decreases. This turns the conventional argument that
immigration helps the welfare state through higher employment upside down.
3 Conclusion
This paper puts some caution on the conventional wisdom that immigrant labor im-
proves the ﬁnancial sustainability of pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced pensions. In a model with
centralized wage setting, it was shown that immigration beneﬁts the retirees only if
total employment declines. The creation of additional jobs, in contrast, harms old-age
security. This ﬁnding originates in the fact that labor demand is inelastic in equi-
librium. Consequently, any employment increase reduces the wage bill, the source of
public pension ﬁnancing.
The combination of Proposition 2 and 3 allows to conclude that immigration helps
the soundness of public pensions only if the absolute value of the elasticity of labor
demand exceeds the unemployment rate. In the light of the empirical estimates on εt
lying around unity (Hamermesh, 1993, Table 3.2), this is likely to be the case.8 Immigrant Employment and Demographic Burden
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